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APOLLO EXPER I ENCE REPORT 
I '  DEVELOPMENT FLIGHT INSTRUMENTATION 
By Norman B. Farmer 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
SUMMARY 
I 
In this report, the development flight instrumentation systems that were supplied 
as Government-furnished equipment for 25 Apollo vehicles a r e  discussed. These 
systems, which were used to flight-test and qualify the earlier Apollo vehicles, were 
designed, integrated, and tested at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (for- 
merly the Manned Spacecraft Center) and shipped to the prime contractors o r  launch 
sites for vehicle installation. The 8-year activity supported several types of missions 
varying from the first pad-abort launch (boilerplate 6) from White Sands Missile Range 
to the Apollo 13 lunar flight from the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center. During 
this time, techniques were developed to provide for flexible and reliable systems. 
These techniques involved primarily the use of relatively low-cost off-the-shelf equip- 
ment and an accompanying qualification program that ensured the necessary degree of 
reliability for the flight test program. 
Component qualification and acceptance testing was devised to place emphasis on 
the environmental testing of all flight components. This testing was considered a 
major factor in obtaining the overall 98 percent successful data retrieval for the Apollo 
development flight instrumentation systems. Components were standardized between 
vehicles because the development flight instrumentation used a "building block" ap- 
proach that easily accommodated any variation in quantity o r  types of measurements. 
A maximum degree of standardization was also used for component input/output char- 
acteristics, common component test levels, component range selection lists and test 
procedures, and so forth. 
The significant problems encountered in the component. areas involved electro- 
mechanical devices. Tape recorders were of particular concern and required con- 
piderable attention to achieve improved reliability. Some of the most serious problems 
occurred with failures in the vehicle wiring harnesses, which affected the integrity of 
the development flight instrumentation systems. One lesson that was learned was the 
importance of performing a proper system installation design within the vehicle. Poor 
component accessibility and high-density wiring harness design were major factors in 
system failures. 
INTRODUCTION 
In late 1961, the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) (now the Lyndon B. Johnson 
Space Center) began an activity to provide the development flight instrumentation (DFI) 
for the Apollo vehicles. The instrumentation involved in this activity was primarily 
used to provide data during the flight testing phases of the operational subsystems and 
consisted of transducers, amplifiers, modulation packages, tape recorders, transmitters, 
and so forth. The systems were flexible (variable in capacity) and could accommodate 
high-bandwidth analytical parameters; furthermore, the systems were designed to be 
phased out of the Apollo Program as the vehicles became operational. The DFI equip- 
ment was  generally dispersed over all parts of the vehicle and frequently occupied 
locations that were destined later to be taken by the operational systems. Transducers 
were located in such positions as the inside of rocket thrust chambers, the outside skin 
of service modules, the pipes on hydraulic systems, and the surface of structural 
members. The larger elements of the system (modulation packages, tape recorders, 
etc.) were generally centrally sited on shelves (if available) for accessibility. In 
contrast to the DFI, the "operational" instrumentation system was designed as a perma- 
nent entity and was  later phased into the Apollo Program to monitor the vehicle opera- 
tional "housekeeping" parameters. The operational instrumentation was  essentially a 
low-bandwidth system and was  not concerned with analytical-type measurements that 
required high frequency response rates. Although the original intention was to provide 
the DFI systems for the developmental part of the Apollo Program, the equipment w a s  
used throughout the operational phases, including the early lunar missions. All DFI 
systems were supplied as Government-furnished equipment (GFE) from MSC. A DFI 
group managed the MSC in-house activities for the fabrication and delivery of the sys-  
tems. These activities involved system design, component procurement, component 
qualification, system integration, and so forth. 
In all, 25 flight systems were designed and constructed. Eighteen of these were 
actually flown on missions; the remaining seven, because of program changes, were 
used in ground test vehicles o r  were reassigned fo r  use as spares. Additional equipment 
(not full systems) was flown on several other vehicles. The first flight system was used 
on the boilerplate (BP) 6 pad-abort mission at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in 
November 1963. The DFI was supplied to the prime contractors for installation in the 
flight vehicles. A total of 8000 replaceable units (transducers, amplifiers, transmitters, 
etc.) was qualified and supplied as DFI to support the Apollo Program. Some of the 
hardware was  designed and fabricated at MSC; the majority, however, was  obtained 
under contract with 45 equipment vendors. 
The DFI performed well throughout the flight program: no major equipment failures 
occurred and the overall average data retrieval was 98 percent. A secondary benefit 
derived from the DFI activity was  the engineering training of personnel in spacecraft 
equipment. Engineers received a practical indoctrination in the design and operation of 
various equipment and in the development of general testing requirements and specifi- 
cations. The gained knowledge, especially the general testing requirements and 
specifications, became an asset to the Apollo Program and helped in the preparation 
of the operational equipment. Later, DFI specifications were reflected in the 
operational specifications and procedures. 
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The first DFI requirement originated from aerodynamic and structural measure- 
ments on Apollo/Saturn missions 101 and 102, which carried both service modules and 
boilerplate command modules. The initial system design was predicated on large 
quantities of measurements using radio-frequency (13) transmission as the means of 
data retrieval (nonrecoverable mission). Development of the instrumentation design was 
based on systems with approximately 1200 data channels and 7 transmitters; however, 
the initial requirement for DFI on these vehicles was postponed because of the BP-6 
mission at WSMR. The objectives of that test were to demonstrate the launch escape 
system and to test various parts of the boilerplate; 94 measurements were made with 
the DFI system on the BP-6 vehicle. The system performed satisfactorily and provided 
confidence to continue with the basic block design for  future Apollo DFI systems. 
Flight performance information for  each mission is given in appendixes A to D. 
IN IT IAL  PROJECT CONSIDERATIONS 
The decision to supply the DFI as GFE was made for two prime reasons: to permit 
NASA to maintain schedule and system flexibility during the flight test program and to 
relieve the prime contractor workload to allow greater concentration on the operational 
systems. During the initial system design, the fact became apparent that meeting 
schedule deadlines would preclude excessive component development and require that 
systems be designed to use reliable aff -the-shelf equipment. 
done with the NASA George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, the NASA Langley Research 
Center, and other institutions. The resulting information revealed that more research 
and component evaluation would be necessary in the general areas of low-level commu- 
tation, signal condi&ming, and frequency modulation (FM). Because of the extent of 
the projected activity, the decision was made to begin on a long-term design with a 
building-block approach. In the beginning, neither weight nor size was a problem because 
the early boilerplate vehicles were not equipped with operational equipment. However, 
as the activity continued, weight and s ize  became increasingly important as operational 
equipment was introduced and less room was left for  the DFI. The later requirement 
f o r  DFI in the lunar module (LM) necessitated a weight and size reduction of the 
individual components. A comparison of the resultant reduction in DFI component 
characteristics between the command and service module (CSM) and the LM is indicated 
by the following statistics. 
To determine the best selection of telemetry hardware, considerable research was 
1. Average LM component volume = 20 percent of CSM counterpart 
2. Average LM component weight = 32 percent of CSM counterpart 
3. Average LM component power = 27 percent of CSM counterpart 
The DFI was not subject, as w a s  the operational equipment, to the more stringent 
reliability and quality assurance (R&QA) control measures at vendor plants. To remove 
most reliability risk factors associated with off -the-shelf equipment, applicable R&QA 
standards were adopted and a qualification and test program was performed at MSC on 
all components. Considerable emphasis was placed on acceptance testing to reveal 
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fabrication and quality control weaknesses in prospective flight hardware. Most of the 
DFI ground-support equipment used by the prime contractors was  supplied by MSC. 
This was the most economical approach because it ensured a maximum standardization 
of test equipment and test procedures for the project. 
One significant factor in ensuring the integrity of the DFI systems was the adoption 
of the breadboard integration tests. In these predelivery tests, the actual flight compo- 
nents of a particular system were strapped to a large, metal-covered breadboard. The 
entire system was energized, checked, and subjected to electromagnetic-interference 
conditions. The cabling on the breadboard was similar to that used on the flight vehicle. 
The test method ensured, as far as possible, that the system would work after it was  
delivered and that it also would function within the electromagnetic-interference envi- 
ronment inside the vehicle. Both the system and the breadboard were shipped to the 
prime contractor so that the system could be checked and accepted before installation. 
Furthermore, if problems occurred in the vehicle, the contractor could use the bread- 
board for additional system checking. 
Project engineers were assigned the responsibility for specific vehicle systems. 
For instance, a project engineer at MSC would be responsible for a system and the 
testing of that system. He would then monitor and approve the installation and testing 
performed at the prime contractor facility, ultimately following through to the NASA 
John F. Kennedy Space Center or WSMR and the launch. For backup, resident teams 
of DFI-trained contractor personnel were assigned by MSC to provide daily liaison 
with Houston, to implement modifications, and generally to expedite the solutions to 
system problems. 
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
In the general system design, certain salient items helped to standardize the 
approach and to provide a sound basis for the systems. One such item and one of the 
first  to be decided on was  the operating signal voltage for subcarrier oscillators, 
amplifiers, commutators, and tr'ansducers. A cross  section of the various transducer 
types that would have had to be used could have produced output voltages varying from 
millivolts to volts in combination with various polarities and bias offsets. Although 
subcarrier oscillators that accommodated these varying sensitivities and conditions of 
signals could be acquired, the decision was made to standardize all subcarrier oscillators 
at a signal input of 0 to 5 volts. Therefore, the amplifier or  transducer would have to 
supply 0 to 5 volts regardless of the polarity o r  input swing of the parameter. Appar- 
ently, in many cases, tailoring the subcarrier oscillators to suit the varying parameter 
conditions would have been easier. However, considering that each subcarrier oscillator 
within a given package was  of a different frequency, the fact  became readily apparent 
that an additional variable, the subcarrier oscillator input voltage, would compound the 
problems of spares and interchangeability. 
Consideration then w a s  given to the low-level part of the system in which commu- 
tation apparently would be most economically advantageous because of the required low 
frequency response and the profusion of measurements (thermal surveys, strain 
measurements, etc.) .  The original systems were designed in accordance with a 
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10-millivolt signal input standard. No range from any of the low-level devices was ex- 
pected to give less than this value, considering any possible dynamic range of the forcing 
functions. Previous experience with noise problems at these levels indicated that the 
systems should be designed with balanced signal-conditioning networks having output 
impedances of 100 ohms. The fact that the required low-level data were generally less 
than 10 hertz permitted filtering in the frequency spectrum above which most electrical 
interference occurred. This approach permitted fairly long line lengths (approximately 
of f u l l  scale. Low-level transducers requiring high frequency response were fed directly 
into high-gain direct-current amplifiers and converted to  a high level (0 to 5 volts) for  
insertion into the subcarrier oscillators. The output and input impedances of amplifiers 
and conversion devices were designed to be approximately 1000 and 50 000 ohms, respec- 
tively. High-level transducer output impedances were generally designed to be a maxi- 
mum of 1000 ohms. By establishing fairly rigid rules on system impedances and voltages, 
component engineers (who had to deal with 45 vendors) were provided with fairly specific 
standards fo r  procurement and interface specifications. 
I 40 feet) f o r  remote sensor locations and kept noise levels to approximately 1 percent 
Before the individual design of many components could be established, the matter 
of automatic calibration had to be decided. Automatic calibration was considered a 
desirable system feature, providing it did not compromise the system in cost and 
reliability. One of the benefits to be derived from this approach is that it provides a 
fast and easy way to check ;i system before launch and in flight. However, many valid 
arguments exist for not using such a method. In many cases, calibration functions do 
not exercise telemetry channels completely from end to end; therefore, the system is 
only partly checked. Many high-level transducers were not equipped to accommodate 
automatic calibrations and would have had to be specially modified. This modification 
would have destroyed the integrity already built into off -the-shelf components. Certain 
transducers (resistance thermometers, thermocouples, strain gages, etc. ) can be 
checked effectively and easily by minor circuit additions into signal-conditioning net- 
works. Others, such as variable-reluctance pressure transducers and crystal accel- 
erometers, cannot be checked as easily and are scarcely worthy of the attempt because 
of the complexity involved. Also, when an ambient condition (temperature, pressure, 
etc.) falls within the dynamic range of a sensor, a good channel-verification point is 
provided. Furthermore, certain units a r e  so reliable that to check them is probably 
superfluous. It also must be remembered that when a system is commanded into a 
calibration mode, the system must necessarily switch from the true data position. There- 
fore, the risk of inflight malfunction exists; the system may either shift o r  remain in 
the calibration position and return only calibration information instead of data. Although 
there were many reasons f o r  not using such a feature, the convenience of a fast built-in 
test arrangement overrode the objections and an automatic calibration system was 
designed into the DFI. This system included the transducer elements, where practical, 
and all signal amplifiers except vibration-charge amplifiers. The subcarrier oscillators 
also were switched into either five- or two-step calibration levels, and the commutators 
had fixed-reference voltages impressed on certain channels. This general philosophy 
of system calibration was followed throughout the DFI activity because it provided a 
quick check f o r  faultfinding and reduced unnecessary probing into already functioning 
system areas. 
The DFI system design was not founded on a redundant concept as were the later 
operational CSM and LM systems. At the time, redundancy, in the true sense of 
duplication, seemed to be extremely complex and expensive; furthermore, the DFI 
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equipment was not subject to the stringent mission-essential requirements that governed 
the later operational equipment. Certain aspects of the design compensated somewhat for 
the lack of redundancy. Where practical, most units had internally regulated power 
supplies, which, in effect, made them independent of any commonly regulated supply 
(excluding the prime battery) and thus free  from most single-point power failures. Units 
designed with this characteristic consisted of high-level transducers, signal amplifiers/ 
converters, subcarrier oscillators, mixer amplifiers, transmitters, and, to some 
power-to-signal lines for most of the front-end instrumentation, thus assisting the 
I 
I extent, low-level conditioning units. This concept also made possible the use of isolated 
overall design to achieve a single-point grounding system with a minimum of potential 
loops. 
( 
Another feature that helped to compensate for no redundancy was  the cross loading 
of batches of measurements to different modulation packages and transmitters. In other 
words, if a given area of the spacecraft was  subjected to a specific survey of measure- 
ments, where practical, the measurements would be distributed across various r f  links. 
Thus, in the case of the partial or entire loss of a link, a percentage of the pertinent 
measurements would still be preserved. 
The central part of the system was the signal-conditioning unit, which channeled 
most of the signals. This unit served as a central checking point and was  capable of 
quick access for channel and range changes when the system was already installed in 
the vehicle. Furthermore, this unit permitted programed inflight time sharing for the 
purpose of maximum use of high frequency channels. This unit and the central power 
unit contained all the system fusing, which was used in both single and grouped compo- 
nent powerlines. Fusing arrays were optimally designed into the DFI system because a 
high possibility of system damage existed during a mission. The equipment w a s  to be 
used in the initial proving stages of the Apollo Program, during which high s t resses  
and violent maneuvers were imposed on the vehicles with some possible catastrophic 
effects. One such case w a s  BP-12, which was launched from WSMR. Par t s  of the 
service module rammed the bottom of the CSM boilerplate and severed some DFI cables 
feeding several pressure transducers. Some fuses were blown in the affected system 
area, but the short-circuiting effect on the powerlines was  not transferred to the 
remainder of the system, which continued to function. 
Components of the system were designed and specified to include polarity-reversal 
circuitry with one exception: the power and control unit, through which all prime power 
was fed and switched. . This overall precautionary design concept saved schedules and 
equipment because many of the systems were subjected to inadvertent power-polarity 
reversal during testing. 
The overall selection of the DFI system, regarding modulation transmission and 
tracking, was controlled by the existing telemetry ground stations and radars in the 
Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) and at WSMR. The requirements for instrumen- 
tation called for  wide-band multichannel systems capable of catering to data rates f rom 
2 kilohertz to steady states. The choice was a pulse amplitude modulation (PAM)/pulse 
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duration modulation (PDM)/FM/FM system; the PDM part  was used exclusively for  
multiplex tape recording. Briefly, this part of the system conformed to the following 
design parameters. 
1. Commutation 
a. 90 channels X 10 samples/sec (PAM/PDM) 
b. 90 channels X 1-1/4 samples/sec (PAM/PDM) 
c. 3 channels x 0.8 sample/sec (PAM) special high frequency data commutator 
(2 kilohertz) 
2. Modulation 
a. Proportional bandwidth (PBW) systems interrange instrumentation group 
(IFUG) channels 2 to 16 and channel E 
b. Constant bandwidth (CBW) systems Aerospace Industries Association 
channels IC to 1Oc 
3. Transmission: Very high frequency (vhf) 228.2 to 257.3 megahertz (FM) 
4. Tracking 
a. C-band transponders 
b. 5690 to 5765 megahertz 
5. Recording 
a. 14 tracks on 1-inch tape at 15 in/sec 
b. Commutated data - 90 x 10 PDM and 90 X 1-1/4 PDM 
c. Continuous data- PBW channels 2 to 16 
d. Wide-band data - FM record 14.5 kilohertz (2-kilohertz data) 
The low-speed commutation rate of 90 channels X 1-1/4 samples/sec was previ- 
ously used in Project Mercury and, although suitable for many quasi-static parameters, 
was not considered fast enough to resolve discrete events adequately for the Apollo 
Program; hence, a rate of 90 channels X 10 samples/sec was additionally adopted. The 
commutators that had a rate  of 3 channels X 0.8 sample/sec were specially developed to 
time-share high frequency data (as much as 2 kilohertz) effectively on single continuous 
channels. Various makes and sizes of PBW modulation packages, the larger ones 
containing 16 channels, were used throughout the DF'I project. Channel E was generally 
used for the loading of high-rate commutators. The CBW packages, which were used 
in the LM phase of the project, were introduced to accommodate the large amount of 
high frequency data and to reduce the number of rf links. These packages could absorb 
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as manyas  10 channels of 2-kilohertz information and were, in fact, the first CBW 
systems ever flown. The systems, although having relatively large capacities for 
high frequency data, had certain drawbacks. First, the information loading on the sub- 
car r ie rs  resulted in a modulation index (MI) of 1 (2-kilohertz data). Second, because 
of the relatively high number of channels occurring at the high end of the spectrum 
(compared to PBW IRIG), the transmitter MI per channel was down to 0.3, the overall 
permissible vhf transmitter deviation being 128 kilohertz (ground-receiver bandwidth 
limitations). This loading, with its resultant low values of modulation index, gave 
reduced FM improvement with consequently lower signal-to-noise ratios than the PBw 
systems. Altogether, the systems were very useful as convenient large-capacity tools 
to obviate the need for additional rf  links but had to be used within the sense of their 
limitations. 
1 
2 
I 
During the boilerplate stages of the DFI activity, 12-watt tube-type transmitters 
were used. Later, these transmitters were superseded by 5-watt and then by 10-watt 
solid-state units as the DFI equipment was phased into the CSM and LM vehicles. Early 
missions generally conformed to short-range ballistic or  100-nautical-mile-altitude 
Earth-orbital paths; in these cases, the radiated power was more than sufficient to give 
high positive circuit margins to MSFN and WSMR. 
appear to be conservatively designed. With the inception of the LM Earth-orbital vehi- 
cles, which used as many as five 10-watt DFI transmitters, the systems were designed 
to meet a worst-case 3-decibel margin in conjunction with the MSFN helical vhf antennas 
at a required slant range of 1200 nautical miles. Data-channel noise under these condi- 
tions generally conformed to less  than 2 percent of full scale for the PBW systems. 
However, the CBW systems, for the reasons previously discussed, gave better per- 
formance near the stations and assumed channel-noise levels of approximately 3. 5 percent 
full scale for slant ranges of 600 nautical miles. 
From this viewpoint, the rf links 
FLIGHT SYSTEM BREADBOARDING 
The block diagram of the basic DFI systems (fig. 1) illustrates a design approach. 
The only differences in the various systems a r e  in the number and types of measurements 
made and in the number of pieces of telemetry equipment (commutators, modulation 
packages, and transmitters) used to accommodate these measurements. The photo- 
graphic cameras and onboard tape recorders that were used on the CSM boilerplate and 
production vehicles, however, are not shown in figure 1. 
'It is preferable to use an MI value of 2 (or greater) in this part of the system, 
car r ie r  deviation since lower values produce poorer signal-to-noise ratios; MI = modulation frequency * 
6l 
A higher value of MI (say 1) would be preferable at this part of the system to L 
permit a better signal-to-noise ratio. (See also footnote 1. ) 
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Figure 1. - The DFI system block diagram. 
After acceptance testing, each component was mounted on a breadboard system 
(fig. 2). The breadboard consisted of a movable A-frame-shaped structure on which the 
equipment could be easily mounted and electrically interconnected. The breadboard 
proved to be a convenient, useful, and necessary tool for verifying an entire system 
operation. The breadboard also served as a handy shipping container. 
After breadboard drawings had been prepared, the flight-qualified components were 
installed on the breadboard. The components were interconnected according to the 
schematics and prepared for system tests. The DFI test console (fig. 3) was developed 
to verify the operation of the system and components and to isolate system wiring mal- 
functions and other operating problems. A typical DFI subsystem installation in an 
LM is seen in figure 4. (This particular example is from LM-2.) 
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Figure 2. - A typical breadboard system. Figure 3. - The DFI test console. 
Figure 4. - The DFI system installed 
in LM-2. 
ACCEPTANCE AND QUAL1 FI  CATION 
TEST1 NG 
A s  early as 1961, a general plan of 
component qualification was outlined for  the 
DFI. Although at that time the main con- 
cern was  selecting and evaluating certain 
components, the ground rule was established 
that the overall project would include envi- 
ronmental testing for acceptance as well as 
for qualification. The DFI was based on 
off-the-shelf equipment, and, to detect 
manufacturing defects and provide confidence 
for  flightworthiness, the decision was made 
to subject each flight unit to the most critical 
flight environments. The selected environ- 
ments were vibration, temperature, vacuum, 
and acceleration. Each unit also was bench 
tested to electrical specifications. This mode 
of acceptance testing was pursued throughout 
the DFI activity and was  considered to be 
the major contributor in ensuring reliable 
flight component operation. 
The qualification testing for  each com- 
ponent type that was  evolved contained 12 
separate environmental tests. However, the 
number of tests varied slightly throughout 
the activity. The peak test levels were 
founded on values above the maximum design 
limits; that is, any level expected in any 
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vehicle area that might contain DFI equipment. This was a major difference between 
the DFI and operational qualification philosophy. Whereas most DFI components were 
qualified at one level, the operational equipment was tailored for specific environmental 
zones within the vehicles. The standardized concept was used on the DFI to ensure that 
most equipment could be used and installed in any part of a vehicle without incurring 
different o r  additional qualification. Use of this concept not only permitted general 
mounting flexibility but also simplified procedures, procurement, and paperwork. 
environments. Examples of this exposure occurred in the service modules, where 
components were mounted on thin shelving and were subjected to high vibrational 
g-forces. Other components were mounted through the service module skin where both 
high acoustic noise and vibration levels were imposed. To cater to these types of condi- 
tions, a part  of the general qualification document was written to include a section for 
"space-exposed and/or extreme conditions. '' This section allowed the imposition of 
especially high levels where applicable. The use or partial use of the latter procedure 
was more the exception than the rule. 
I 
I 
I' 
In a few cases, components (generally transducers) were exposed to high-intensity 
An example of the difference of levels between the general and extreme qualifi- 
cations is shown by a comparison of the vibration specifications. The former required 
12.3g; the latter required 45g. In general, the extreme qualification section was a 
"catchall" that satisfied all high environmental requirements and, at the same time, 
standardized the qudification testing. 
COMPONENT FAILURES 
The failure rates and problem areas associated with equipment after delivery to 
the prime contractor are shown in table I. The survey involves the preinstallation and 
postihstallation component failures on seven LM-type vehicles. The following facts 
were derived from the i.-+ormation in table I. 
TABLE I. - DFI EQUIPMENT FAILURES AFTER DELIVERY TO PRIME  CONTRACTOR^ 
1 F a i l u r e s  reported for LTA- l ,b  LTA-2R, LTA-8, LTA-lOR, LM-1, LM-2, and LM-31 
aAn additional 43 f a i l u r e s  reported were determined to be incorrect (i. e . ,  no failures occurred). 
b~~ test article (LTA) 1. 
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Most of the failures were induced by some external means into the DFI. Of the 
106 induced failures, most (71) were caused by personnel action; that is, handling, 
installation, and so forth. It is also interesting to  note in the induced-failure area that 
postinstallation failures outweigh preinstallation failures by approximately 2 to 1; this 
ratio indicates that most component damage occurred after vehicle installation. , 
i 
1 
i 
Of a total of 45 equipment failures, 16 were major. The remaining 29 were minor 
and, although attributable to various causes, were primarily out-of -tolerance calibration 
i conditions. Failures of this kind would warrant replacement only if replacement was 
convenient. The 43 incorrectly reported DFI failures (table I footnote (a)) a r e  the inev- 
itable results of premature diagnosis and preliminary test investigations. h 
1 
In summary, the information in table I indicates that the highest failure rate on the 
equipment was caused by handling. There a r e  approximately 2.4  induced failures fo r  
every 1 equipment failure. Some of the problems were prompted by inaccessibility, by 
vehicle cabling design, and by the fact that some equipment was within the personnel 
"traffic" flow through the vehicle. Also, the fact that only four major failures occurred 
because of component parts defects (resistors, capacitors, etc.) is significant. The DFI 
used mature hardware; hence, most of the poorer component parts were already screened 
from the equipment. This factor, together with the additional screening effected by the 
acceptance testing at MSC, reduced the parts problems to minor proportions. Although 
involving a different prime contractor, the trends displayed were similar for  the DFI 
systems supplied for the boilerplate vehicles and the command and service modules. 
Some actual flight failures a r e  listed in table 11, which contains information from 
a survey including 10 DFI flight systems on vehicles BP-6 to spacecraft 011 (SC-011). 
These vehicles afforded a better opportunity to investigate flight failures than the 
LM vehicles because most of the systems were r.ecovered and postflight analysis was 
possible. From the information in table 11, i t  is apparent that the causes and types 
of failures covered are varied. The number of static surface-pressure failures (8) 
seems relatively high; but this can be explained on the basis that this area sometimes 
included more than 50 percent of all system measurements. However, vibration and 
acoustic failures did prompt a revision of qualification levels to accommodate extreme 
environments as mentioned previously. The relatively high number of wiring failures 
(10) accounts for nearly 50 percent of all failures and s t resses  the criticality of this 
area. 
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TABLE 11. - DFI FAILURES IN  FLIGHT^ 
(a) Measurement failures 
Measurement type I Number of failures 
Pressure (motor combustion) 
Pressure (static surface) 
Pressure (f luc hating su rfac e) 
Calorimeter (surface) 
Thermocouple (surface) 
Vibration (surface) 
Strain (beam) 
Acoustic (interior) 
Total 
1 
8 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
1 
23 
- 
Probable cause of failure 
(b) Causes 
Number of failures 
_ _ ~  ~ 
Vibration 
Constricted pressure lines 
Acoustics 
Wiring (short or open circuit) 
Unknown 
. 
Total 
4 
3 
3 
10  
3 
23 
a A total of 1104 measurements was  made; 9 complete and 14 partial measurement 
failures occurred. Failures were reported fo r  BP-6, BP-12, BP-13, BP-15, BP-22, 
BP-23, BP-23A, SC-002, SC-009, and SC-011. 
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SPECIAL SYSTEMS 
One interesting part of the program was the supplying of some special GFE instru- 
mentation systems. These systems were small  compared with the average DFI vehicle 
systems, but each one had to be supplied on a compressed schedule. Some were identified 
as being required 2 or  3 months before the vehicle launch time. In fact, the vehicle was 
frequently on the launch pad when the initial requirement arose. 
One such camera system, which was installed on CSM-020, generated stereographic 
mapping photographs across  the width of the United States; it additionally provided 
photographs of the plasma phenomenon during reentry. The entire system was self- 
contained because i t  was  not to interfere with, o r  impact in any way, the operational 
and DFI equipment already on board the spacecraft. The equipment consisted of two 
cameras, a timing and delay unit, a battery, and an accelerometer start mechanism 
that was triggered by the ascent g-force of the vehicle. The system was  designed, 
fabricated, and qualified within a 3-month period. The system was used successfully 
and provided, for the first time, a set  of overlapping stereographic photographs across  
the United States. One of the photographs is shown in figure 5. 
Another camera system, supplied on a previous spacecraft (CSM-017), produced 
a sequence of color pictures of the Earth from a 10 000-nautical-mile altitude. These 
pictures, which were the first taken of the Earth from that distance, were published 
worldwide. . An example is shown in figure 6. 
Figure 5. - A photograph of White Sands, Figure 6. - The first photograph of the 
New Mexico; one of 370 Earth-mapping 
pictures taken during the Apollo 6 
mission, 
Earth taken from an altitude of 
10 000 nautical miles, 
14 
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SCHEDULES AND MANPOWER LEVELS 
The manpower peak for the DFI activ- 
i ty was reached between December 1965 
and June 1966. During that time, the NASA 
and contractor support was approximately 
40 and 125 men, respectively. This peak 
support was  prompted by the requirement 
to deliver seven LM systems within an 
8-month period. Curves representing the 
manpower applied to the DFI program are 
shown in figure 7. All DFI systems were 
delivered to the contractors on schedule. 
A list of the delivery dates is included in 
table 111. 
loo- 
Time, yr 
Figure 7. - Variation of DFI 
manpower levels with time. 
? 
Delivery date to 
prime contractor Launch date Vehicle Apollo mission 
TABLE IU. - APOLLO DFI PROGRAM MILESTONES 
PA- 1 
A-00 1 
AS- 10 1 
AS- 102 
-- 
A-002 
PA-2 
A-003 
December 1962 
March 1963 
April 1963 
July 1963 
February 1965 
May 1963 
January 1965 
July 1964 
BP-6 
BP- 12 
BP- 13 
BP-15 
aBP- 14 
BP-23 
BP-23A 
BP-22 
sc-002 A-004 December 1964 January 20, 1966 
bSC-O1O -- January 1965 -- 
- 
November 7, 1963 
May 13, 1964 
May 28, 1964 
September 18, 1964 
-- 
December 8, 1964 
June 29, 1965 
May 19, 1965 
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TABLE III. - APOLLO DFI PROGRAM MILESTONES - Concluded 
Vehicle Launch date Delivery date to prime contractor Apollo mission 
Command module - Concluded 
aSC -006 
a SC-008 
sc-009 
sc-011 
SC-017 
sc-020 
sc-101 
SC- 103 
‘HS- 1 
a LTA-8 
LTA-2 
LTA- 10 
LM- 1 
aLM-2 
LM- 3 
LTA-B 
-- 
-- 
AS-201 
AS-202 
4 
6 
7 
8 
-- 
6 
4 
5 
-- 
9 
8 
December 1964 
February 1965 
December 1964 
March 1965 
August 19 6 5 
November 19 6 5 
June 1966 
August 1966 
Lunar module 
February 1966 
May 1966 
October 1966 
June 1966 
June 1966 
August 19 66 
October 1966 
August 1968 (to Kennedy 
Space Center ) 
-- 
February 26, 1966 
August 25, 1966 
November 9, 1967 
April 4, 1968 
October 11, 1968 
December 21, 1968 
-- 
April 4, 1968 
November 9, 1967 
January 22, 1968 
-- 
March 3, 1969 
December 21, 1968 
Ground test vehicle. 
House spacecraft (HS) 1. 
a 
C 
PROBLEM AREAS 
The major component problem areas  were in electromechanical devices and in- 
volved attitude gyros, cinecameras, and tape recorders. Although all these components 
were troublesome in regard to reliability and delivery schedules, tape recorders were 
1 the major concern. 
Tape Recorders 
Tape recorders were key components in the DFI systems because they were a 
prime source of data. Most DFI was selected on a proven off-the-shelf basis. The 
first  recorders were selected similarly because they were involved in production runs 
totaling more than 100 units and were proved in high-linear-g environments on sled tests. 
Despite their apparent ruggedness, they failed in the required 12.5g vibration environ- 
ment and had to undergo major redesign modifications on the main housing castings to 
meet this requirement. 
Various troubles continued to  plague the recorders during the DFI activity: motors 
burned out, tape jammed or would not start, tape curled on reel edges, and, periodically, 
certain tracks would not record because of improper tape-to-head tension. After various 
modifications, however, they were made operable for flight usage. One of the contrib- 
uting factors to the successful flight operation of these recorders was the exclusive 
handling and tape loading by a few trained personnel who stayed with them until launch. 
Later in the program, a higher capacity recorder was introduced; this recorder was a 
complete departure from the former type and used a co-belt system with flangeless 
tape reels. In effect, this design was used to compensate for  the previous problems of 
flutter and tape packing. However, a new set of problems arose regarding belt tension 
and belt materials. Various modifications to the capstans and belts had to be made to 
make the recorder operational f o r  the later boilerplate and airframe ser ies  of launches. 
The problem of recorder qualification was  in the vibration areas. It was difficult 
to make a recorder with a relatively high tape capacity conform to ."wow and flutter" 
specifications under a 12.5g random environment. One factor that alleviated the situ- 
ation and permitted easier qualification was the introduction of shock mounts. The 
problems that involved bearings, motors, and tape a re  standard problems that continue 
in present-day flight tape recorders. The reason for this situation is probably twofold. 
First, the fundamental principle of pulling tape is still the same. Furthermore, the 
fact that flight recorders a re  frequently redesigned or greatly modified for  various pro- 
grams tends to negate the maturity o r  reliability that might be established with a given 
type. 
Commutators 
Another area of concern that can be categorized as electromechanical is commu- 
tators. In 1963, low-level commutators were not available in a reliable solid-state 
configuration. At that time, the DFI used mechanical devices for multiplexing the 
low-level measurements. Initially, these devices proved very reliable, having lifetimes 
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(800 hours) approaching those of the electronic units. However, the reliability was  
compromised when the devices were modified to program channel and rate selection. 
This modification increased the number of switching poles and caused heavier motor 
loading. This w a s  a classical case of improving an item that was highly reliable to  the 
point that it became complicated and unreliable. The resultant lifetime was reduced to 
approximately 250 hours, and the units were phased out of the LM systems and replaced 
by solid-state devices, which by then had become available. All high-level-type commu- 
tators used solid-state techniques throughout the project and proved to be reliable 
components. 
Vehicle System Cabling 
The area of concern that seriously affects the integrity of the entire system is the 
vehicle cabling. Neglect in the proper design, accessibility, and installation of cables 
can offset all the reliability engineered into the components of the system. The fact 
that the DFI harness was completely replaced twice on BP-6 and once in LM-1 is 
evidence of a problem area. In the BP-6 harness, the problems were design and fabri- 
cation errors ;  for instance, all the signal shields were inadvertently short-circuited 
because uninsulated instead of insulated shields were used. This type of cable problem 
was  not as detrimental to the system as the LM-1 problem. 
certain DFI components led to the design of a central signal-conditioning unit that had 
a density of 1600 connector pins over a 45-square-inch faceplate. This unit was demon- 
strated on the system breadboard at MSC as being operational but requiring care  in 
installation to provide for cable accessibility. The unit was installed initially in LM-1 
in a relatively inaccessible position, and the mating cable harness consisted primarily 
of no. 26 AWG wire. After a ser ies  of requirements changes and troubleshooting 
procedures that involved moving and opening the signal-conditioning unit, some of the 
wires in the harness became fatigued and broken. This problem was also manifested 
in the harness in other a reas  where cable movement was  excessive. The situation 
deteriorated to the point at which attempts to  rectify certain cable breakages precipi- 
tated further breakages in adjacent areas. The Apollo Program was forced into the 
major decision of reinstalling the signal-conditioning unit with a new swing-out shelf 
(for accessibility) and refabricating and installing a new DFI harness with heavier gage 
wire  (24 AWG). 
In LM-1, the scarcity of available space and the consequent miniaturization Of 
Handl ing Damage 
Handling failures were induced by such things as excess power voltage, reverse 
power polarity, overpressure, riveting, and physical damage during and after instal- 
lation. It is impossible to avoid handling failures at field s i tes  despite all the Precau- 
tions and procedures. However, any equipment installation should be delayed to the last 
possible moment to avoid vehicle manufacturing operations as much as possible. The 
overall provision of spares for components must necessarily take into account the 
attrition resulting from handling damage; this point is amplified by the comments 
already made in the "Component Failures" section, which shows the relatively high 
incidence of handling failures. 
18 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The building-block approach used on the DFI project permitted a standardized 
system that was basically common to the Apollo vehicles. This feature, together with 
the programable signal-conditioning units, allowed flexibility in program changes and 
new requirements. Measurement changes were implemented on flight vehicles sometimes 
within a matter of hours; some small systems were designed, qualified, and installed 
in periods of 3 months. 
b 
Certain features of the activity helped to permit this versatility. The project had 
access to fast purchasing through the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center procurement 
chain, and the hardware that was purchased was  invariably off-the-shelf type and 
readily available. Moreover, the DFI w a s  not subject to the "mission critical" standards 
as were the operational systems and consequently had greater latitude in reliability and 
quality control. This feature eliminated the necessity for the inclusion of "high reli- 
ability" parts and generally excluded the equipment from any developmental programs. 
The fact that all flight hardware was acquired on ''fixed cost" contracts (rather than 
"cost plus" type contracts generally incurred by developmental contracts) is an indication 
of the small  amount of development work involved throughout the project. 
As in most flight test activities, the DFI requirements were generally defined late. 
In some cases, th"ts late definition only permitted a period of approximately 12 months 
between the go-ahead and the actual system delivery to the prime contractor. Certain 
measures that were taken helped alleviate these scheduling problems; one of these 
involved the standardization of measurement ranges. Transducers comprised the 
largest area of the system, contained the greatest variety of component types, and 
were subject to the greatest number of changes (because of varying measurement 
requirements). To simplify and expedite procurement, transducer ranges were stand- 
ardized to cut down the variety of instruments. In effect, the project offered a stand- 
ardized list of transducer measurement ranges instead of responding to specific range 
requests. The standardized levels that were established for  component qualification 
ensured that DFI equipment generally could be installed in any part of a vehicle without 
incurring additional testing. This not only permitted mounting flexibility but also 
simplified procedures, procurement, and paperwork. Similarly, standardization of 
electrical specifications for components, regarding input/output voltages, impedances, 
and so forth, ensured simplified system interfaces and set specific controls and stand- 
ards  for procurement with the component vendors. This latter point was significant 
because it provided clear guidelines to component engineers who had to interface with 
approximately 45 equipment vendors. 
The DFI project obtained an overall 98-percent successful data retrieval. Two 
factors were major contributors in achieving this status. First, off -the-shelf mature 
hardware was selected; this hardware had already been screened for  poor par ts  by usage. 
(Only minor par ts  problems were experienced throughout the activity). Second, all 
flight hardware was subjected to acceptance procedures that emphasized environmental 
testing and effectively weeded out the weaker components before commitment for  flight 
purposes. Certain precautionary design features were instrumental in minimizing 
system problems during the testing and operational phases of the DFI activity. The 
adoption of internally regulated power supplies (where practical) for individual units 
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made most parts of the system independent of single-point power supply failures and 
also permitted signal-to-powerline isolation, which prevented ground loop problems 
and gave greater immunity from electrical interference. The DFI was not designed 
with true redundancy, and such features as independent power regulators precluded 
the possibility of losing large sections of the system because of single power unit 
failures. The technique of cross loading measurements from a given area onto different 
radio-f requency transmitters and modulation packages provided some functional redun- 
dancy and ensured that a percentage of pertinent parameters could be preserved if a 
major system link were lost. Most units of the system were designed to include polarity- 
reversal circuitry to prevent the gross destruction of components during inadvertent 
system power reversals. The reversal of power polarity on complete systems (and 
components) actually occurred many times during the project. 
Various problems are discussed in the report, but one of the most significant 
areas  f rom which some very important lessons were learned concerned system cabling. 
From the cabling problems cited, three conclusions can be drawn. First, high-density 
wiring configuration should be avoided. Second, signal conditioning should be decentral- 
ized or made remote so that low-density connector configuration can be achieved to 
permit easy access and repair and not result in inflexible bundles of cables. Third, the 
DFI system involved frequent equipment changes; therefore, it should use a heavier 
gage w i r e  than the  more permanently situated, operational-type equipment. For general 
signal wiring, no. 22 AWG wire is recommended, although no. 24 AWG wire is suitable 
if weight becomes a constraining factor. Finally, the installation design with respect 
to accessibility should be given proper and timely attention. Neglect of this a rea  will 
promote needless damage and generally wil l  lead to a more unreliable system. In the 
component area, tape recorders proved to be the most problematical because they 
occupied key positions and were relatively unreliable. Failure in a recorder would 
have meant a significant or total loss of data; consequently, these devices were given 
exclusive personnel handling treatment throughout their test and flight phases. 
The benefits gained from keeping the DFI independent a r e  worth mentioning. Obvi- 
ously, the DFI had many interfaces with other systems, which were, in fact, the sources 
of the measurement parameters. The point to be made, however, is that the control, 
power, wiring, and calibration functions generally were independent of other onboard 
systems. 
DFI because of measurement changes could be implemented with little or  no impact on 
the vehicle operational systems. It also meant that the DFI could be checked out with- 
out disturbing other systems. The DFI was used frequently to take advantage of un- 
scheduled vehicle downtime for additional testing because of its overall independence 
of operation. It could be quickly energized and checked with its own support equipment. 
The net result was that testing of the system w a s  easily dovetailed into the vehicle 
master test plans and provided a convenient means for  schedule optimization during the 
vehicle test operations at the prime contractors' plants. 
This fact  meant that modifications (particularly late ones) required of the 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, November 16, 1973 
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APPENDIX A 
BOILERPLATE PHASE 
INTRODUCTION 
The boilerplate (BP) vehicles were constructed to simulate the weight, shape, and 
center of gravity of the man-rated Apollo spacecraft. The flight test ser ies  consisted of 
five launches from White Sands Missile Range and two from the NASA John F. Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC). In addition to the rocket launches, boilerplate vehicles were 
dropped from aircraft, impacted into land and water, and used during parachute- 
evaluation tests. The boilerplate vehicle, originally quite simple, became a complex, 
this phase gathered data about basic spacecraft design, operation of subsystems, and 
compatibility of spacecraft and launch vehicles. 
I 
I 
functioning unmanned spacecraft as the program progressed. The test program during 
APOLLO MI SSlON PA-1, BP-6 VEHICLE 
A total of 94 measurements was required on BP- 6 during Apollo mission PA- 1. 
The development flight instrumentation (DFI) flight equipment used is listed in table A-I. 
The BP-6 during launch escape system test firing is shown in figure A- 1. 
The system operated satisfactorily except for two pressure-measurement channels. 
One incurred a 4-second interruption and the other a 1-psi calibration displacement. 
TABLE A-I. - BP-e FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
Component 
Telemetry modulation package 
Telemetry radio-frequency (rf) package 
Timer 
Tape recorder 
Signal conditioner 
Power control 
Junction box 
Main battery 
Pyrotechnic battery 
Rate gyroscope package 
Attitude gyroscope 
Linear accelerometer 
Vibration system 
Amplifier rack 
Pressure transducer 
Temperature system 
Amplifier 
Resistance thermometer 
Quantity 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
6 
6 
3 
42 
4 
5 
4 
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Figure A-1. - The BP-6 vehicle during 
launch escape system test firing. 
i !.-* . 
Figure A-2. - The launch Of BP- 12. 
APOLLO MISSION A-001, BP-12 VEHICLE 
Apollo mission A-001, the second abort 
test ,  used BP-12 to test the launch escape 
system under high dynamic pressure and 
transonic speed conditions. The test vehicle 
consisted of the spacecraft (launch escape 
system, BP-12 command module, and 
boilerplate service module) and the launch 
vehicle (Little Joe II (LJ-II) booster) 
(fig. A-2). 
- 
A total of 138 measurements was  re- 
quired on BP-12 during mission A-001. The 
DFI equipment complement was  similar to 
that flown on BP-6. The equipment used is 
listed in table A-11. 
The telemetry system performed satis- 
factorily except for a brief disturbance at 
28.47 seconds into the flight and the failure 
of three measurements to provide data. The 
three 16-millimeter cameras provided flight 
data, but the service module camera evident- 
ly was  damaged by the explosive force from 
the thrust termination of the LJ-I1 booster. 
TABLE A-II.- w - 1 2  FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
Component 
Telemetry modulation package 
Telemetry rI package 
C-band transponder 
Tape recorder 
Timer 
Signal conditioner box 
Junction box 
Main battery 
Pyrotechnic battery 
Power control box 
Rate gyroscope package 
Attitude gyroscope 
Linear accelerometer 
Relay box 
Pressu re  transducer 
Beacon line filter 
Amplifier rack 
Amplifier 
Resistance thermometer 
Temperature signal condltioner box 
Temperature simulator box 
Commutator 
Camera 
- 
uantity 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
3 
6 
1 
26 
2 
9 
15 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
-
APOLLO MISSION AS-101, BP-13 VEHICLE 
Apollo mission AS-101 was the f i r s t  flight of an Apollo spacecraft configuration 
with a Saturn booster vehicle. The test vehicle consisted of the booster (Block 11 
Saturn I and an S-IVB) and the spacecraft (launch escape system, BP-13 command 
module, and boilerplate service module). The DFI equipment is listed in  table A-111. 
Performance of the instrumentation and communications systems throughout 
the mission was satisfactory. Analysis revealed that 106 of the 112 measurements 
provided reliable data. 
TABLE A-III. - BP- 13 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
Component 
Telemetry modulation package 
Telemetry rf package 
C-band beacon 
Power control box 
Junction box 
Battery 
Signal conditioner box 
Amplifier rack 
Amplifier, direct current 
Pressure transducer 
Accelerometer 
Vibration system 
Strain gage 
Commutator 
Resistance thermometer 
Calorimeter 
Zone box 
Temperature signal conditioner box 
Beacon line filter 
Quantity 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
6 
1 
15 
22 
25 
7 
3 
48 
1 
16 
20 
20 
1 
2 
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APOLLO MISSION AS-102, BP-15 VEHICLE 
Apollo mission AS-102, the second flight of an Apollo spacecraft configuration with 
a Saturn launch vehicle, was launched from KSC on September 18, 1964. The BP-15 
spacecraft w a s  used for this test. Figure A-3 is a block diagram of the instrumentation 
and communications subsystems. A total of 133 measurements was required on BP-15 
during mission AS- 102. The DFI equipment used to obtain the required measurements 
is listed in table A-IV. 
The flight performance of the BP- 15 instrumentation system was satisfactory. Of 
a total of 133 measurements, 131 provided continuous data. The two C-band beacons 
provided good tracking information throughout the flight, 
vhf omnidirectional antenna 
C-band C-band 
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Power divider 
transponder 
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Power divider 
transponder 
90 X 1-114 
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Figure A-3. - The instrumentation and communications subsystems used on BP-15. 
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TABLE A-IV. - BP-15 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
Comp.onent 
Telemetry modulation package 
Telemetry rf package 
90 x 10 commutator 
90 X 1-1/4 commutator 
Main signal conditioner box 
Temperature signal conditioner box 
Amplifier rack 
Amplifier 
Vibration system 
Pressure transducer 
Accelerometer 
Strain gage 
Resistance thermometer 
Thermocouple 
Calorimeter 
Zone box 
Microphone 
Ball assembly 
Quantity 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
11 
21 
6 
24 
7 
48 
20 
9 
20 
20 
1 
1 
APOLLO MI SSlON A-003, BP-22 VEHICLE 
The BP-22 spacecraft, which was launched on an LJ-I1 booster, contained 
230 DFI measurements. The flight equipment is listed in table A-V. The flight 
performance of the BP-22 instrumentation system was proved satisfactory by the 
proper function of all 230 measurements during Apollo mission A-003. However, 
significant information was not obtained from some of the instrumentation because of 
an early abort of the flight. 
I 
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TABLE A-V. - BP-22 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
Component 
Telemetry modulation package 
Tape modulation package 
Commutator 
Telemetry rf package 
C-band beacon 
Beacon line filter 
Tape recorder transport 
Tape recorder electronics 
Tape recorder line filter 
Camera battery 
Logic battery 
Coded timer 
Signal conditioner box 
Signal distribution box 
Power control box 
Main battery 
Junction box 
Rate gyroscope package 
Attitude gyroscope 
Junction box 
Inverter 
Pressure transducer 
Accelerometer 
Amplifier 
Accelerometer 
Pressure transducer (acoustic) 
Amplifier rack 
Br eakwir e measurement adapter 
Frequency detector 
Quantity 
2 
10 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
44 
6 
49 
34 
9 
2 
1 
1 
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TABLE A-V. - BP-22 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT - Concluded 
Component 
Voltage monitor, alternating current 
Temperature signal conditioner box 
Zone box 
Thermocouple 
Calorimeter 
Resistance thermometer 
Camera 
Camera mount 
Camera control box 
Pulse generator 
Strain gage 
Displacement transducer 
Quantity 
1 
1 
19 
3 
19 
6 
3 
3 
3 
3 
8 
1 
APOLLO MISSION A-002, BP-23 VEHICLE 
The BP-23 spacecraft, which was launched on an W-11 booster, contained 190 DFI 
measurements. The flight equipment is listed in table A-VI. 
Of the 132 tape-recorded channels, 128 provided satisfactory data during Apollo 
mission A-002. The C-band beacons were interrogated by three PPS-16 radars  during 
flight. The command module was  tracked throughout the flight, and satisfactory return 
signals were received from both transponders. The tower and command module cameras 
performed satisfactorily. The service module camera provided only 4 seconds of usable 
film before it jammed because of mechanical malfunction. 
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TABLE A-VI. - BP-23 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
Component 
Amplifier 
Resistance thermometer 
Pressure transducer 
Linear accelerometer 
Junction box 
Transponder 
Beacon line filter 
Relay box 
Pressure transducer 
Amplifier 
Telemetry modulation package 
Telemetry rf package 
Onboard timer 
Tape recorder 
Signal conditioner box 
Rate gyroscope 
Attitude gyroscope 
Power control box 
Main battery 
Pyrotechnic battery 
Linear accelerometer 
Strain gage 
Displacement transducer 
Camera 
Camera mount 
Camera control box 
Camera pulse generator 
Quantity 
3 
3 
53 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
11 
16 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
7 
4 
8 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
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APOLLO MI SSlON PA-2, BP-23A VEHICLE 
The vehicle DFI used on BP-23A (pad-abort mission PA-2) was  the refurbished 
I system that was used on BP-23 for Apollo mission A-002. The instrumentation 
subsystem provided good quality data from all measurements on the vehicle. Complete 
telemetry data coverage was  obtained from the ground stations. 
The two onboard cameras, one mounted in the launch escape system tower and 
one in the command module, operated as programed by the subsystem control box. The 
tower camera showed launch escape system motor plume impingement on the command 
module until the lens was sooted during tail-off of the launch escape motor. The com- 
mand module camera, started at 5 seconds after launch, gave excellent coverage of 
- = 
- 
- apex-cover jettison, tower jettison, and all parachute deployments. 
F 
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APPENDIX B 
COMMAND AND SERV I CE MODULE PHASE 
INTRODUCTION 
The command and service module (CSM) phase of the test program used vehicles 
These vehicles were used to confirm the structural integrity and the 
that were constructed to the production model configuration of the man-rated Apollo 
spacecraft. 
operational capabilities of the Apollo subsystems. All Apollo vehicles listed in this 
appendix, with the exception of spacecraft 002 (SC-002), were launched from the NASA 
John F. Kennedy Space Center on Saturn boosters. 
APOLLO MISSION A-004, SC-002 VEHICLE 
A total of 242 onboard measurements was required on Apollo mission A-004. 
Satisfactory data were obtained from 237 of the 242 onboard measurements. Failure 
of the single operational scimitar antenna (because of damage by protective-cover 
jettison) following abort caused a loss of both radio-frequency telemetry links at 74.7 
seconds after lift-off. However, data transmitted by these links were recorded on the 
onboard tape recorder and recovered. The spacecraft was launched on a Little Joe IJ 
booster. The SC-002 flight equipment is listed in table B-I. 
TABLE B-I. - SC-002 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
I Component I Quantity 
Telemetry package 
Tape modulation package 
90 X 10 high-level commutator 
Main instrument battery 
Tape transport 
Tape electronics 
C-band transponder 
Line fi l ter  C-band transponder 
Signal distribution box 
Signal conditioner box 
Power control box 
2 
10 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
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TABLE B-I. - SC-002 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT - Concluded 
Component 
5-volt reference supply 
25-volt reference supply 
Time reference generator 
Logic battery 
Amplifier, direct current 
Microphone assembly 
Amplifier, alternating current 
Rate gyroscope package 
Attitude gyroscope system 
Gyroscope package 
Inverter 
Junction box 
Pressure transducer 
Amplifier, alternating current 
Pressure transducer 
Angular displacement 
Resistance thermometer 
Thermocouple 
Calorimeter 
Zone box 
Accelerometer 
Linear accelerometer 
Strain gage 
Camera 
Camera mount 
Camera control box 
Camera pulse generator 
Camera batterv 
Quantity 
1 
1 
1 
2 
98 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
51 
31 
2 
2 
13 
3 
6 
9 
29 
6 
164 
1 
1 
1. 
1 
1 
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APOLLO MISSION AS-201, SC-009 VEHICLE 
An instrumentation package in the CSM interfaced with the communications 
subsystem and processed 37 measurements from the structural subsystem, the in- 
strumentation system, the service propulsion system, and the reaction control system 
during Apollo mission AS-201. An instrumentation package in the service module 
interfaced with the communications subsystem and processed 93 measurements from 
the structural subsystem. The SC-009 and service module flight equipment is listed 
in table B-11. The performance of all development flight instrumentation (DFI) equip- 
ment w a s  satisfactory. 
TABLE B-II. - SC-009 AND SERVICE MODULE FLIGHT EQUPMENT 
Component 
Telemetry package 
Modulation assembly 
Transmitter 
90 x 10 high-level commutator 
5 -point calibrator 
90 x 10 low-level commutator 
Time-code generator 
Command receiver 
Auxiliary decoder 
Command receiver voltage regulator 
Modulation kit pulse amplitude modulation 
(PAM)/frequency modulation (FM)/FM 
system 
5 -point calibrator 
Quantity 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
SPACECRAFT 010 
A DFI system for  SC-010 was designed, procured, checked, calibrated, and in- 
stalled on a breadboard, The integrated systems checkout of the breadboard was com- 
pleted successfully, and the breadboard was shipped to the contractor facility. However, 
because of the success of the SC-002 mission, SC-010 was not flown. Components were 
returned to bonded storage areas at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center to be used in 
other instrumentation systems. 
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APOLLO MISSION AS-202, SC-011 VEHICLF 
The DFI system for SC-011 was composed of the items listed in table B-111. An 
instrumentation package interfaced with the communications subsystem and processed 
60 measurements from the structural subsystem, the operational instrumentation 
system, the service propulsion system, and the reaction control system. A second 
package processed 93 additional measurements from the structural subsystem. The four 
camera systems were used to record panel and apex-cover deployment. All DFI equip- 
ment operated satisfactorily during Apollo mission AS-202. 
TABLE B-111. - SC-011 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
Component 
Telemetry package 
Modulation assembly 
FM transmitter 
90 x 10 high-level commutator 
5 -point calibrator 
Tape recorder support equipment 
90 x 10 low-level commutator 
Time-code generator 
Modification kit PAM/FM/FM system 
Camera 
Camera power distribution 
Timing pulse generator 
Battery 
Baroswitch 
Control box 
Quantity 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
APOLLO 3 MI S S  ION, SC-012 VEHl CLE 
Instrumentation equipment was supplied for  the Apollo 3 mission (SC -012) but 
was never required because of the accident and fire within the spacecraft. 
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APOLLO 4MISSION, SC-017 VEHICLE 
The DF'I equipment used on the Apollo 4 mission is listed in table B-N. A self- 
contained camera system was included for purposes of photographing the Earth from 
a 10 000-nautical-mile apogee. Overall performance of the SC-017 telemetry system 
and camera system was satisfactory. 
TABLE B-IV. - SC-017 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
Component 
Modulation package 
90 x 10 high-level commutator 
90 x 10 low-level commutator 
Time-code generator 
Camera system 
Camera 
Lens 
Camera control box 
"Gf' switch 
Battery 
Quantity 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
APOLLO 6 MISSION, SC-020VEHICLE 
The SC -020 vehicle contained instrumentation and camera systems (table B-V) 
similar to those used on the Apollo 4 mission. Equipment was provided to acquire 
Earth-mapping and CSM plume-impingement photographs. Performance of these systems 
was satisfactory, and useful data were obtained throughout the Apollo 6 mission. 
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TABLE B-V. - SC-020 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
Component 
Modulation package 
90 x 10 high-level commutator 
90 x 10 low-level commutator 
Time -code generator 
Boost/entry camera 
Boost/entry-camera control box 
Earth-mapping camera 
Earth-mapping-camera control box 
I '  G" switch 
Battery 
36 
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Quantity 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
APPENDIX C 
LUNAR MODULE PHASE 
INTRODUCTION 
In addition to the flight vehicles, several ground test vehicles were constructed 
for the lunar module (LM) phase. The LM test article (LTA) vehicles contained only 
development flight instrumentation (DFI) systems and were designed to gather information 
on vibration and strain and to obtain acoustical data. Later configurations of the LM 
k 
- 
- ~ vehicle contained additional subsystems and more sophisticated instrumentation. 
instrumentation measured additional parameters such as temperature, pressure, and 
The 
- 
acceleration. A C-band radar was  also included. 
HOUSE SPACECRAFT 1 
A total of 241 DFI measurements was  initially installed on house spacecraft 1 
(HS-1). The equipment was similar to that used on LM-1. 
structed for ground test purposes and for in-house training. 
The HS-1 vehicle was con- 
LUNAR MODULE TEST ARTICLE 1 
The DFI system installed in HS-1 was later reinstalled in LTA-1. The LTA-1 
vehicle was constructed for ground test and training purposes. 
APOLLO 4 MISSION, LTA-10 VEHICLE 
A total of 38 DFI measurements was made on the'LTA-10 vehicle for the Apollo 4 
mission (table C -I). The instrumentation system performed satisfactorily except for 
three accelerometers that exhibited temporary bias offsets during maximum dynamic 
pressure conditions. This vehicle also carried the first constant bandwidth (CBW) 
modulation package to be launched into space. 
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TABLE C-I. - LTA- 10 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT ' 
I Component 
Modulation assembly, CBW 
Modulation assembly, proportional bandwidth (PBW) 
90 x 10 high-level commutator 
2 5 -volt power supply 
Signal conditioner box 
Power control box 
Temperature resistance thermometer 
Vibration system 
Linear accelerometer 
10-watt transmitter 
Acoustic pre s sure transducer 
Amplifier 
5-volt reference supply 
Strain gage 
Quantity 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
9 
5 
2 
2 
22 
1 
64 
APOLLO 6 MISSION, LTA-2 VEHICLE 
The DFI system for the LTA-2 vehicle was very similar to the one installed on 
LTA- 10 and performed satisfactorily throughout the Apollo 6 mission. 
APOLLO 5 MISSION, LM-1 VEHICLE 
A total of 195 DFI measurements was installed on the LM-1 vehicle for  the Apollo 5 
mission. The flight equipment used is listed in table C-11. The instrumentation system 
performed satisfactorily, with the exception of seven measurements that did not re- 
spond as planned. Four thermocouple measurements malfunctioned (probably became 
unbonded), and three low-pressure measurements failed (probably because of con- 
stricted ports from engine firing). 
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TABLE C-II. - LM-1 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
Component 
10-watt transmitter 
Telemetry modulation assembly, PBW 
Telemetry modulation assembly, CBW 
Signal conditioner 
90 X 10 high-level commutator 
90 X 10 low-level commutator 
Vibration commutator 
90 x 1-1/4 low-level commutator 
Power control box 
5-volt reference supply 
C-band beacon 
C-band filter 
25-volt reference supply 
Amplifier 
Strain gage 
Pressure transducer 
Vibration system 
Temperature resistance thermometer 
Temperature thermocouple 
Zone box 
St r ain/t empe r atur e system 
Quantity 
5 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
38 
80 
45 
18 
36 
25 
41 
2 
LUNAR MODULE 2 
The DFI system on LM-2 was nearly identical to that installed on LM-1. The 
system was completely checked and accepted at the contractor facility before the 
decision was  made to  place LM-2 in a nonflight status. 
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APPENDIX D 
MANNED FLIGHT VEHl CLE PHASE 
INTRODUCTION 
The launch of the Apollo 7 spacecraft on October 11, 1968, marked the beginning 
of the manned Apollo vehicle flights. Development flight instrumentation (DFI) was 
provided by NASA for three manned missions: Apollo 7, Apollo 8, and,Apollo 9. 
APOLLO 7 MISSION, COMMAND AND 
SERVl CE MODULE 101 VEHl CLE 
A total of 167 DFI measurements was made on command and service module 101 
(CSM-101) during the Apollo 7 mission. The flight equipment is diagramed in figure D-1 
and listed in table D-I. The telemetry systeri performed satisfactorily except for one 
high-level commutator that became erratic during the reentry phase. 
APOLLO 8 MISSION, CSM-ltY3 VEHICLE 
A total of 36 DFI measurements was made on CSM-103 during the Apollo 8 mission. 
Equipment similar to that used for  CSM-101 (table D-I) was used for CSM-103 (table D-II). 
The telemetry system performed satisfactorily during the mission. 
APOLLO 8MISSION, LTA-B VEHICLE 
A total of six DFI measurements was  used on LTA-B for the Apollo 8 mission. 
The instrumentation performed satisfactorily during the mission. 
APOLLO 9MISSION,  LM-3VEHICLE 
A total of 248 DFI measurements w a s  made on LM-3 during the Apollo 9 mission. 
The.flight equipment used is listed in table D-III. 
248 measurements indicated an average return of 98.7 percent of the data over the 
10-hour period of system operation. 
The overall evaluation of the total 
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~ i i q h t  qualification tape recorder 
Parameters 
Command module 
Structure 
Temperature (251 
Pressure (91 
Temperature (481 
Flux rate 1141 
Vibration (21 
Guidance and navlqati 
Resolver 161 
Vibration 131 
Events (21 
Voltage (101 
Temperature (11 
Environmental contro Temperature (61 Operational pulse code 
modulated telemetry 
Service module 
Environmental contro 
Temperature (2) 
Service propulsion 
Temperature (51 
Structure 
Vibration 18) 
Temperature (61 
Note 
The thick black lines indicate 
OF1 equipment. 
CBW * constant bandwidth 
DFI - development flight instrumentation 
lRlC - interrange instrumentation group 
PDM - pulse duration modulation 
ref - reference 
Key. 
Figure D-1, - The CSM- 101 flight-qualification instrumentation diagram. 
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TABLE D-I. - CSM-101 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
90 X 10 high-level commutator 
90 x 10 low-level commutator 
Modulation package, constant bandwidth (CBW) 
Time-code generator 
Component I 
2 
1 
2 
1 
Modulation package, proportional bandwidth (PBW) 
Time-code generator 
TABLE D-II.- CSM-103 FLIGHT EQUIPMENT 
1 
1 
1 Component 1 Quantity 
E 
TABLE D-111. - LN1-3 FLIGHT EQUlPMENT 
Component 
10-watt transmitter 
Telemetry modulation assembly, PBW 
Telemetry modulation assembly, CBW 
. Signal conditioner 
90 x 10 high-level commutator 
90 x 10 low-level commutator 
Vibration commutator 
90 x 1-1/4 low-level commutator 
Power control box 
5-volt reference supply 
C-band beacon 
C-band filter 
25-volt reference supply 
Strain gage 
Pressure transducer 
Temperature resistance thermometer 
Temperature thermocouple 
Zone box 
Strain/temperature system 
Vibration system 
Pressure transducer 
Amplifier 
Power control timer assembly 
90 x 10 low-level commutator 
NASA-Langley, lQ?4 5-58? 
Quantity 
5 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
80 
30 
35 
25 
48 
ia 
2 
4 
33 
1 
1 
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